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Article 
Liability Insurance and Gun Violence 
PETER KOCHENBURGER 
Gun violence and mass shootings have dominated headlines during the 
last several years.  These tragedies, including the Sandy Hook Elementary 
School shooting, received national and international attention and 
prompted new demands to address gun violence in the United States.  
Among the many proposals advanced by the media, advocacy groups, 
legislators, and academics is mandating liability insurance for all gun 
owners.  Proponents point to insurance’s risk assessment and mitigation 
functions as providing financial incentives and penalties to encourage 
policyholders to purchase, store, and use firearms in the safest manner 
possible, with explicit analogies to mandatory auto insurance, and 
insurance generally, where prudent behavior results in lower premiums 
and the riskier pay more.  Numerous legislative proposals were put forth in 
2013; none passed. 
This Article’s purpose is to provide a more in-depth scrutiny than has 
been previously presented on the merits of mandating liability insurance 
for gun owners.  My perspective is through the lens of liability insurance 
and regulation, and this Article thereby reviews the major issues 
associated with such proposals—including the likelihood that many 
defendants in gun-related claims will not carry insurance even if required 
by law.  I conclude that, despite the obvious enforcement problems, 
insurance’s ability to address and reduce gun violence is a potentially 
valuable tool.  We do not have enough research and information to dismiss 
its use based on often ill-supported assumptions about what insurance 
“should” do and how consumers, insurers, and regulators would react to a 
liability insurance mandate. 
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Liability Insurance and Gun Violence 
PETER KOCHENBURGER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On December 14, 2012, Adam Lanza entered Sandy Hook Elementary 
School in Newtown, Connecticut, and murdered twenty children and six 
adults.1  This mass shooting, the worst grade school rampage in U.S. 
history, reignited the gun control debate and led to immediate calls for 
stricter control laws and equally vocal, if less numerous, demands for 
providing armed guards or police in schools as well as arming teachers.2  
Within four months, Connecticut passed one of the most comprehensive 
gun control laws in the country, the reverberations of which continued well 
past the end of the legislative session in June 2013.3  
Throughout 2013, the popular media and insurance-related press also 
discussed using insurance as a potential tool to manage many of the threats 
                                                                                                                          
* Associate Clinical Professor of Law and Executive Director, Insurance Law Center, University 
of Connecticut School of Law.  I would like to thank Professors George Mocsary, Patricia McCoy, 
Sachin Pandya, and Peter Siegelman, Insurance Law Librarian Yan Hong, and David Snyder.  Research 
assistants Chad Vincente, Connor McNamara, and Tashika Russell provided invaluable help.   
1 The New York Times and the Hartford Courant have extensive online material about this 
tragedy and its aftermath.  Times Topics: Newtown, Conn., School Shootings (Adam Lanza), N.Y. 
TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/s/school_shootings/index.html (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2014); Tragedy in Newtown: Continuing Coverage, HARTFORD COURANT, 
http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/newtown-sandy-hook-school-shooting/ (last visited Apr. 15, 
2014).  In November 2013, the Office of the State’s Attorney for Danbury, Connecticut—which was 
responsible for criminal prosecutions in Newtown—issued its report.  STEPHEN J. SEDENSKY III, 
REPORT OF THE STATE’S ATTORNEY FOR THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF DANBURY ON THE SHOOTINGS AT 
SANDY HOOK ELEMENTARY SCHOOL AND 36 YOGANANDA STREET, NEWTOWN, CONNECTICUT ON 
DECEMBER 24, 2012 (2013), available at http://www.ct.gov/csao/lib/csao/Sandy_Hook_Final_Report.p
df.  In December 2013, the Connecticut State Police released much more extensive reports and related 
multimedia files.  Sandy Hook Elementary School Shooting Reports, CONN. DEPARTMENT EMERGENCY 
SERVS. & PUB. PROTECTION, http://cspsandyhookreport.ct.gov (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).  
2 E.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Report Sees Guns as Path to Safety in Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 
2013, at A18; Associated Press, Connecticut Community Approves Armed Guards for Schools, NEW 
HAVEN REG. (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.nhregister.com/general-news/20130327/connecticut-
community-approves-armed-guards-for-schools; Wayne LaPierre, Making Our Nation’s School 
Children Safer, NRA-ILA INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION (June 1, 2013), http://www.nraila.org/news-
issues/articles/2013/6/making-our-nations-school-children-safer.aspx. 
3 “An Act Concerning Gun Violence Prevention and Children’s Safety” was signed into law on 
April 4, 2013.  2013 Conn. Acts 47 (Reg. Sess.).  Various provisions of the Act were challenged on 
Constitutional grounds; a federal district court upheld the law in January 2014.  Shew v. Malloy, 994 F. 
Supp. 2d 234, 239 (D. Conn. 2014).  
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or harms that firearms and gun ownership can cause.4  By February 2013, 
insurance requirements for gun ownership were introduced in at least seven 
states and the District of Columbia, but did not survive in any of them.5  
This is not surprising, as only a small percentage of bills ever emerge from 
any legislature,6 and the legislation linking gun ownership to insurance was 
usually either vague or likely unworkable on its face.7  However, while 
these efforts were easy to criticize—and for some to ridicule—their origin 
lay in a long-accepted recognition that liability insurance often plays an 
important role in regulating potentially dangerous products. 
                                                                                                                          
4 E.g., Rick Green, Time Is Ripe to Consider Liability Insurance for Gun Owners, HARTFORD 
COURANT (Jan. 21, 2013), http://articles.courant.com/2013-01-21/news/hc-green-gun-liability-
newtown-20130121_1_gun-owners-liability-insurance-gun-safety; John Stoehr, Changing the Rhetoric 
from Gun Control to Gun Insurance, GLOBALPOST.COM (Jan. 18, 2013, 4:16 PM), 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/commentary/gun-control-gun-insurance-NRA; 
John Wasik, Newtown’s New Reality: Using Liability Insurance to Reduce Gun Deaths, FORBES (Dec. 
17, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnwasik/2012/12/17/newtowns-new-reality-using-liability-
insurance-to-reduce-gun-deaths/; see also Michael Cooper & Mary Williams Walsh, Buying a Gun? 
States Consider Insurance Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2013, at A1 (discussing state proposals to 
mandate liability insurance for gun owners); Brian MacQuarrie, Warren Joins Menino Push for 
Tougher Gun Control Laws, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 19, 2013, at B3 (discussing legislative support for a 
Massachusetts bill that would require liability insurance); Elizabeth Bunn, U.S. Insurers Resist Push to 
Make Gun Owners Get Coverage, BLOOMBERG.COM (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/2013-02-19/u-s-insurers-resist-push-to-make-gun-owners-get-coverage.html (detailing insurers’ 
opposition to liability insurance proposals); Bonnie Cavanaugh, Insurance Industry Closely Watches 
Proposed Firearms Liability Laws, PROP. CASUALTY 360 (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.propertycasualt
y360.com/2013/04/12/insurance-industry-closely-watches-proposed-firear (discussing the insurance 
industry’s perspectives on proposed liability insurance mandates).  The three hour legislative 
subcommittee public hearing on Connecticut’s bill to mandate liability insurance for gun owners on 
March 13, 2013, is demonstrative of the hostilities toward such proposals.  Insurance & Real Estate 
Committee, CONN. NETWORK (Mar. 19, 2013), http://ct-n.com/ondemand.asp?ID=8809.  The bill died 
immediately after the hearing.  
5 H.B. 6656, Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2013); B. 20-0170, 2013 Council, Reg. Sess. (D.C. 
2013); H.B. 1155 amend. 20, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013); S.B. 577, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013); H.B. 3253, 188th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2013); Assemb. B. 3908, 
2013–2014 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013); H.B. 521, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2013).  For a 
discussion of the proposal for an insurance requirement in California, see infra note 7.  Bills cited in 
this Article may have been subsequently amended or removed entirely from a state’s legislative 
calendar.  
6 See Karen Suhaka, Comparing State Legislatures by Counting Bills, BILLTRACK50.COM, 
https://www.billtrack50.com/blog/election/comparing-state-legislatures-by-counting-bills/  (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2014) (suggesting that a number of states have bill success rates as low as ten percent, with 
even the most successful states being around fifty percent).   
7 See, e.g., Assemb. B. 3908 (“Any person in this State who shall own a firearm shall . . . 
obtain. . . a policy of liability insurance in an amount not less than two hundred and fifty thousand 
dollars specifically covering any damage resulting from any negligent acts involving the use of such 
firearm while it is owned by such person.” (emphases added)).  When introduced in February 2013, 
California Assembly Bill 231 contained a liability insurance requirement, Don Thompson, California 
Bill Would Force Gun Owners to Buy Insurance, INS. J. (Feb. 7, 2013), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2013/02/07/280464.htm, but the requirement was dropped 
long before a modified version of the bill passed in the fall, Assemb. B. 231, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Cal. 2103). 
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Liability insurance protects the financial assets of policyholders 
engaged in socially useful activities (e.g., home ownership, driving 
vehicles, undertaking a profession, running a business); provides a source 
of compensation to injured claimants; encourages the design and use of 
safer products; and serves as a private regulator as insurers assess, accept 
or reject, and price risk for individual policyholders.8  Liability insurance 
theoretically could provide similar benefits to private gun ownership.  
However, there are three major obstacles: two are surmountable, though 
politically difficult, and one is more intractable.9  First, if most firearm 
injuries are intentionally caused and result from illegal actions, then the 
standard liability policy excludes coverage for the policyholder.  Second, 
there is a weak—or nonexistent—correlation between the safety incentives 
that liability insurers could encourage and their coverage obligations under 
their insurance policies.  Third, even if states required insurers to provide 
liability coverage for intentional harm caused by firearms, and likewise 
required gun owners to purchase it, some individuals would not comply. 
This Article’s purpose is to contribute to the ongoing public policy 
debate on insurance and gun violence.  It links legislative proposals that 
require liability insurance for gun owners to existing insurance policy 
language, explains the practical consequences of how seemingly minimal 
changes in wording can affect coverage, and describes how insurers are 
already narrowing liability coverage for intentionally caused harm, with 
important consequences for insuring firearm use.  Many opponents of 
mandatory firearm insurance have overstated their case and this Article 
suggests how, despite the difficulties described, states could fashion an 
insurance framework to cover firearm violence.  This Article 
acknowledges significant limitations to any proposal to mandate and 
enforce compulsory liability insurance for gun owners, but argues it is too 
soon to dismiss the many potential advantages of such a liability insurance 
system for significantly reducing gun violence.   
This Article reviews approximately twenty different policy forms from 
the largest personal lines writers in the country to document the 
diminishing coverage for intentional harm and negligence claims 
surrounding intentional acts.  Rather than use the standard methodology of 
focusing largely on differences in case law related to insuring intentional 
harm, this approach more accurately captures the state of the insurance 
                                                                                                                          
8 See Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers 
Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412, 1416–23 (2013) (discussing the ways in which liability 
insurance influences moral behavior).  See generally RICHARD V. ERICSON ET AL., INSURANCE AS 
GOVERNANCE (2003) (explaining the regulatory roles of insurance). 
9 This Article does not address Second Amendment concerns, which are important considerations 
in any proposal to mandate liability insurance.  This issue is reviewed briefly in another article 
published within this Symposium Issue, George Mocsary, Insuring Against Guns?, 46 CONN. L. REV. 
1209, Part III.B.5 (2014).  Professor Mocsary is a leading Second Amendment scholar.  
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market, and thus (typically) the state of available insurance coverage.  
While case law obviously is important, it is derivative of the actual 
intentional harm exclusions in insurance policies and does not reflect the 
marketplace reduction in coverage for intentional harm; there is often a 
significant time lag between the policy language scrutinized by courts and 
commentators and the language many insurers currently utilize.10   
II.  LIABILITY INSURANCE AND GUN VIOLENCE11 
A.  Benefits of Liability Insurance 
There is a long and often favorable story to tell of how insurance has 
enhanced public safety.  Just as insurers helped to encourage safer 
automobiles,12 they may likewise be able to enhance gun safety by funding 
research, utilizing data collected through their underwriting and claim 
handling processes, supporting public information campaigns, and 
lobbying legislatures and government agencies.13  Even more important is 
insurers’ potential “gatekeeping function” in denying coverage to high-risk 
individuals,14 as well as their ability to adjust premiums based on the 
mitigating effects of owning a less risky type of firearm, utilizing gun 
safety devices, storage requirements, and enrollment in firearm safety 
courses.15 
                                                                                                                          
10 Too little attention is paid to insurance policy language in this area, as well as the ability of 
state regulators and legislators to regulate policy terms.  See infra Part II.C.1. 
11 For purposes of this Article, “violence” means injuries and deaths involving a firearm, 
including suicides.  
12 The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, which was founded in 1959 by three insurance 
associations, focuses on crash safety research and advocacy.  About the Institutes, INS. INST. FOR 
HIGHWAY SAFETY & HIGHWAY LOSS DATA INST., http://www.iihs.org/iihs/about-us (last visited Apr. 
15, 2014).  Not all commentators agree with this sanguine view of insurer participation in auto safety; 
Professor Mocsary’s article references this debate.  Mocsary, supra note 9, Part V.A. 
13 Cf. Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces 
Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 210, 212, 219, 224 (2012) (providing examples of insurers 
funding research facilities to study effective construction techniques, collecting “information 
concerning the circumstances that gave rise to [a workplace] injury,” educating insureds about how to 
reduce risk, and lobbying for air bags).  
14 For a brief summary of insurers’ gatekeeping function, see Tom Baker & Thomas O. Farrish, 
Liability Insurance and the Regulation of Firearms, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY 294–95 (Timothy D. 
Lytton ed., 2005).  An insurance mandate could place insurers in the position of determining whether 
an individual can lawfully own a gun, creating delicate Second Amendment issues.  Mocsary, supra 
note 9, Part III.B.5. 
15 See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 13, at 205–08 (discussing the ability of insurers to adjust 
their premiums based on the severity of the risk of the insured’s activity); see also District of Columbia 
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008) (acknowledging that not all weapons are equal and some have less 
justification for public use than others); Jennifer Bonnett & Wes Bowers, How Newtown Changed Us, 
LODI NEWS-SENTINEL (Dec. 14, 2013), http://www.lodinews.com/news/article_d6ce3ad0-9049-5071-
b291-a3a47c2fe432.html (discussing how one California school district acknowledged that education 
courses about different types of guns and mechanisms can help law enforcement and reduce liability 
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Indeed, encouraging or mandating liability insurance to cover more 
firearms-related injuries would shift some of the costs associated with this 
harm to property casualty insurers, thereby creating greater financial 
incentives for them to utilize their expertise in classifying and spreading 
risk, promoting gun safety, and engaging in other risk mitigation strategies.  
Within the insurance world, health, life, and disability insurers currently 
bear the financial costs of firearm violence,16 at least to the extent that 
victims have such insurance coverage.17  Property casualty insurers have 
minimal exposure now, as many tortfeasors injuring others with firearms 
may not have homeowners or renters insurance and, as discussed below, 
specific provisions in their liability policies are likely to exclude coverage 
for those that do.18  
Insurers’ loss prevention and risk classification roles would be 
similarly limited under their first party property coverages, as the major 
risks and harm associated with careless storage of a firearm—serious 
injury or death—are not related to physical damage to insured property, at 
least not in any meaningful sense.  For example, a homeowners insurer 
might provide premium credits for smoke detectors and other safety 
devices in a home because, should a related loss occur, its policies would 
likely pay for much of the damage.  In contrast, while incentives for 
utilizing certain types of gunlocks or storage methods could reduce 
suicides and homicides, when they do occur, the insurer’s policy would 
likely not be triggered and the insurer would not be obligated to pay claims 
arising out these actions. 
Another major purpose of liability insurance is to provide a source of 
compensation to injured parties.19  Naturally then, some advocates 
maintain that liability insurance could play a similar, socially valuable role 
for victims of gun violence, pointing to, for example, requirements in 
virtually every state that automobile owners carry a minimum amount of 
liability insurance.20  Liability insurance is frequently required by law in 
                                                                                                                          
due to gun violence).  The ability and need to collect this data is also what worries some opponents of 
mandatory insurance requirements for gun owners. 
16 These costs associated with firearm violence may translate into increased premiums.  See Jean 
Lemaire, The Cost of Firearm Deaths in the United States: Reduced Life Expectancies and Increased 
Insurance Costs, 72 J. RISK & INS. 359, 363, 369–71 (2005) (indicating that an “increased cost of 
essential insurance policies” results from firearm violence and specifically analyzing the relationship 
between life insurance costs and firearm deaths). 
17 See EMBRY M. HOWELL & PETER ABRAHAM, URBAN INST., THE HOSPITAL COSTS OF FIREARM 
ASSAULTS 2 (2013) (“Victims of firearm assault are disproportionately more likely to be uninsured.”). 
18 See supra Part II.C. 
19 KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY 77–80 (2008). 
20 Michael Cooper & Mary Williams Walsh, Buying a Gun? States Consider Insurance Rule, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2013, at A1; Ian Simpson, Gun Liability Insurance Could Be Mandatory for 
Firearms Owners Under New State Proposals, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 6, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/06/gun-liability-insurance_n_2632321.html; see also State-by-
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other contexts as well, including professional liability (e.g., medical 
malpractice),21 use of dangerous products (e.g., hazardous waste),22 and 
residential facilities (e.g., nursing homes or child care facilities).23   
Critics of these legislative proposals argue that liability insurance can 
only cover negligent conduct and not intentional acts: “Property and 
casualty insurance does not and cannot cover gun crimes.”24  This is a 
crucial issue, because if proponents of such legislative proposals believe 
liability insurance can help compensate gun victims and promote firearm 
safety, then it must do so either within the existing negligence-based 
framework of traditional liability insurance or within a new type of 
coverage.  Neither option is easy. 
The usefulness of mandating liability insurance depends in part on how 
many victims could benefit.  Here, proponents have a major obstacle 
because the vast majority of gun deaths in the United States result from 
suicide or homicide.25  In 2010, for example, the Centers for Disease 
                                                                                                                          
State Minimum Coverage Requirements, AM. INST. CPAS, http://www.360financialliteracy.org/Topics/
Insurance/Cars-and-Auto-Insurance/State-by-State-Minimum-Coverage-Requirements (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2014) (indicating that every state has “laws that either explicitly or in effect require you to 
purchase at least some auto insurance” and describing the minimum coverage required in each state).  
21 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-11b (2013). 
22 E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 13-22-2-3 (LexisNexis 2011). 
23 E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 404.3 (West 2013) (child care facilities); VA CODE ANN. § 
32.1-127 (2013) (nursing homes). 
24 Bunn, supra note 4 (quoting the American Insurance Association) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The American Insurance Association is a leading property casualty trade association, which 
“represents approximately 300 insurers that write more than $117 billion in premiums each year.”  Id. 
25 Obtaining accurate information on the number and causes of non-fatal gun injuries is difficult.  
In 1996, Congress cut CDC funding for much of its gun-related mortality and injury research.  Walter 
Hickey, How the NRA Killed Federal Funding for Gun Violence Research, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 16, 
2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/cdc-nra-kills-gun-violence-research-2013-1.  Only recently has 
the CDC been permitted to continue a portion of its work in this area.  Id.; see Sydney Lupkin, CDC 
Ban on Gun Research Caused Lasting Damage, ABC NEWS (Apr. 9, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/He
alth/cdc-ban-gun-research-caused-lasting-damage/story?id=18909347 (“President Obama may have 
ended the 17-year ban on gun violence research at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
but even if Congress restores research funds, experts say the damage runs deeper than funding cuts.”).  
 Moreover, gun control advocates and opponents hotly debate demographic definitions and how 
firearm injury causes are classified.  Compare Michael Luo & Mike McIntire, Children and Guns: The 
Hidden Toll, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2013, at A1 (indicating that a “review of hundreds of child firearm 
deaths found that accidental shootings occurred roughly twice as often as the records indicate, because 
of idiosyncrasies in how such deaths are classified by the authorities,” resulting in “scores of accidental 
killings . . . not reflected in the official statistics that have framed the debate over how to protect 
children from guns”), with Dave Kopel, How Your Tax Dollars Demonize Your Guns,                        
NRA MEDIA, http://www.nrapublications.org/index.php/9485/how-your-tax-dollars-demonize-your-
guns/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2014) (arguing that a study funded by the National Institutes of Health 
concluding that “gun ownership . . . correlates with more gun violence” was flawed, in part due to an 
inaccurate categorization of what constitutes “‘possessing’ a gun” and a failure to “measure gun 
ownership accurately”), and CDC Data Refutes New Anti-Gun Study’s Claims, NRA-ILA INST. FOR 
LEGIS. ACTION (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.nraila.org/news-issues/articles/2013/11/cdc-data-refutes-
new-anti-gun-studys-claims.aspx (noting the position of gun control opponents that “[f]irearm-related 
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Control (CDC) reported that out of 31,672 firearm deaths, 61.2% were due 
to suicide, 35% were caused by assault or homicide,26 and only 1.9% 
resulted from “accidental discharge of firearms.”27  This breakdown is 
relatively consistent over the years, as indicated by the table below 
containing CDC data from 2008 to 2011:  
TABLE 128 
 Number Percent of total 
Deaths 
Caused by 
Firearms 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Accidental 
discharge of 
firearms 
592 554 606 851 1.9% 1.8% 1.9% 2.6% 
Suicide by 
firearm 
18,223 18,735 19,392 19,766 57.7% 59.8% 61.2% 61.5% 
Assault 
(homicide) by 
firearm 
12,179 11,493 11,078 11,101 38.5% 36.7% 35.0% 34.5% 
Undetermined 
intent 
273 232 252 222 0.9% 0.7% 0.8% 0.7% 
Total 31,593 31,347 31,672 32,163 100% 100% 100% 100% 
                                                                                                                          
deaths among children have decreased since the mid-1990s,” and questioning gun control advocates’ 
assertion that firearm-related deaths among children have “spiked 60% in a decade” in light of a 
“mistake” in an underlying Centers for Disease Control study where there was a failure “to stipulate 
what ages [were] include[d] in its definition of ‘children’”). 
26 Sherry L. Murphy et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2010, 61 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., no. 4, 
2013, at 1, 11, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_04.pdf. 
27 See id. at 40 tbl.10 (reporting that 606 deaths resulted from “[a]ccidental discharge of 
firearms”).  The remaining 0.8% was classified as “undetermined intent.”  See id. at 41 tbl.10 (citing 
the CDC’s National Vital Statistics Report, which stated that 252 out of 31,328 total “[d]eaths caused 
by firearms” in 2010 were a result of “[u]ndetermined intent”).  Firearm deaths are an imperfect proxy 
for understanding the causes and results of gun violence.  However, the insurance issues discussed in 
this Article generally apply equally to gun violence resulting in non-fatal injuries as well as deaths.  
The Firearm and Injury Center at the University of Pennsylvania Health System analyzed firearm 
injuries and deaths and broke them down by a variety of factors, including age and ethnicity.  FIREARM 
& INJURY CTR. AT PENN, FIREARM INJURY IN THE U.S. (2011) [hereinafter PENN FIREARM STUDY], 
available at http://www.uphs.upenn.edu/ficap/resourcebook/pdf/monograph.pdf.   
28 Donna L. Hoyert & Jiaquan Xu, Deaths: Preliminary Data for 2011, 61 NAT’L                          
VITAL STAT. REP., no. 6, 2012, at 1, 18–19 tbl.2, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_06.pdf; Kenneth D. Kochanek et al., Deaths: Final 
Data for 2009, 60 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., no. 3, 2011, at 1, 39–40 tbl.10, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr60/nvsr60_03.pdf; Arialdi M. Miniño et al., Deaths: Final Data 
for 2008, 59 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., no. 10, 2011, at 1, 36–37  tbl.10, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr59/nvsr59_10.pdf; Murphy et al., supra note 26, at 40–41 
tbl.10.  
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Yet, for the reasons discussed in Part II.C, “accidental discharge” is the 
only firearm-related cause of death or injury that liability insurance would 
likely cover—at least as written under the current negligence-based 
framework. 
B.  Reducing Gun Use in Suicides 
As noted above in Table 1, suicides account for roughly sixty percent 
of gun deaths.  While the exact link between gun ownership and the 
propensity to attempt suicide may still be disputed,29 it is clear that 
individuals attempting suicide by using a gun are far more likely to 
succeed than those attempting suicide by any other means.30  The fatality 
rate for gun-related suicide attempts is reportedly between seventy and 
ninety percent, in comparison to between ten and fifteen percent by other 
means.31  Insurance’s private regulatory or safety enhancing roles could 
help reduce this rate, particularly in preventing or delaying gun access to 
those never intended to use them (e.g., children and teenagers).  Public 
health experts stress that since many suicide attempts are impulsive acts, 
delaying access to a lethal weapon for even a brief period of time will 
reduce suicide rates, as the suicidal impulses fade when the acute phase of 
a crisis passes.32  Risk-based premiums, or the refusal to insure at all, could 
be linked to storage requirements, trigger lock mechanisms, smart guns, or 
similar technologies that could impede someone’s immediate ability to use 
a gun.33 
Unfortunately though, as with intentional shootings, there is not a 
discernable link between the coverages afforded by a liability (or property) 
insurance policy and suicides.  This returns us to the initial problem: a 
                                                                                                                          
29 Compare Matthew Miller et al., Suicide Mortality in the United States: The Importance of 
Attending to Method in Understanding Population-Level Disparities in the Burden of Suicide, 33 ANN. 
REV. PUB. HEALTH 393, 401 (2012) (asserting that the risk of suicide in homes with a firearm is 
“typically 2–10 times that of homes without firearms, depending on the sample population . . . and on 
the way in which the firearms are stored”), with Don B. Kates & Gary Mauser, Would Banning 
Firearms Reduce Murder and Suicide?, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 649, 690–93 (2007) (observing 
“no relationship between the extent of suicide and the extent of gun ownership”). 
30 See Sabrina Tavernise, With Guns, Killer and Victim Are Usually Same, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 
2013, at A1 (stating that “[s]uicidal acts with guns are fatal in 85 percent of the cases, while those with 
pills are fatal in just 2 percent of cases,” and adding that “[t]he chances of dying rise drastically when a 
gun is present, because guns are so much more likely to be lethal”).  
31 PENN FIREARM STUDY, supra note 27, at 22.  
32 See, e.g., Miller et al., supra note 29, at 401–03 (stating that the availability of “highly lethal” 
weapons can play a dominant role in suicide rates).  
33 These safety mechanisms carry the disadvantage of making it more difficult for a person to use 
a gun in self-defense.  While not referencing insurance, the Penn Firearm Study discusses the value of 
safety devices that “reduce unintended discharge” or use: “Making firearms safer would reduce injuries 
from unintentional use and possibly from criminal use.  The processes for stimulating such changes in 
design can include market forces and litigation, consumer education, product oversight, and 
regulation.”  PENN FIREARM STUDY, supra note 27, at 38–39.  
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suicide would rarely trigger the decedent’s and his family’s liability 
insurance policy, regardless of whether a firearm was stored in the safest 
manner possible,34 and therefore the policy has no role in compensating 
victims of a suicide, such as family and friends left behind.  This 
disconnect between an insurer’s financial responsibility under its policy 
and the actions we seek to minimize—suicide attempts, and gun violence 
more generally—makes it difficult to see why the insurance industry would 
bring its money and influence to support this campaign.35   
C.  Liability Insurance and Intentional Harm 
Since liability policies typically cover most negligent acts resulting in 
bodily injury unless specifically excluded,36 claims arising out of a (truly) 
negligent use of a firearm are already covered.  However, CDC reports 
show that firearm deaths resulting from accidental discharges of firearms 
were about two percent of the total gun deaths reported from 2008 to 
2010.37  In contrast, gun deaths classified as an assault or homicide during 
this period constituted about thirty-five to thirty-nine percent of all firearm-
related deaths.38  The CDC defines “homicide” as used in its reports as 
“injuries inflicted by another person with intent to injure or kill, by any 
means.”39  
                                                                                                                          
34 I am not considering instances where a visitor in a home utilizes a policyholder’s gun to 
commit suicide and the visitor’s estate sues the homeowners for allowing access to the firearm.   
35 Insurers might contribute as part of a public service or charitable campaign, but this would 
likely be much less of a commitment than if they were compensating insured losses.  One major 
insurer, however, believes the industry can do more in enhancing gun safety.  Shortly after the 
Newtown tragedy, General Re’s CEO, Franklin Montross, wrote in a column: 
I think the insurance industry can play an important role in both the education and 
the enhancement of gun safety . . . . The insurance industry can’t change the number 
of guns in existence.  We can influence how they are stored and encourage training 
so they are used safely.  Tackling this issue should benefit society and reinforce the 
insurance industry’s commitment to risk engineering and risk mitigation. 
ARTICLE FROM THE CHAIRMAN: GUN SAFETY, GEN. REINSURANCE CORP. (2013), 
http://media.genre.com/documents/GunSafety201301-en.pdf.  Mr. Montross did not reference liability 
insurance.  Id.  
36 None of the homeowners policies I reviewed contained a firearm exclusion.  Firearm exclusions 
are occasionally found in commercial general liability policies, either in the body of the policy or as an 
endorsement, and have been upheld by courts.  E.g., Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Purdie, 193 Cal. Rptr. 
248, 253–54, 256 (Ct. App. 1983); Capitol Specialty Ins. Corp. v. JBC Entm’t Holdings, Inc., 289 P.3d 
735, 737–39 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).  
37 See supra Table 1.  
38 See supra Table 1.  
39 Definitions for WISQARSTM Fatal, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/wisqars/fatal/help/definition
s.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).  This definition “[e]xcludes injuries due to legal intervention and 
operations of war.  Justifiable homicide is not identified in WISQARS.”  Id.  The CDC’s definition 
varies from that used by some state or local medical examiners which may classify as a “homicide” any 
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Liability insurance policies exclude homicides, as defined by the CDC, 
and intentional assaults through several policy provisions that will be 
addressed in Subsection 1 below.  If a liability insurer successfully asserts 
such defenses, then the insurance policy would not serve as a source of 
compensation.  Thus, for liability insurance to be an important tool or 
method to compensate gun violence victims, or to enhance gun safety, 
coverage for intentional harm caused by a firearm would seem to be 
necessary.  
Insurers argue, with justification, that an insurable event should be 
“fortuitous,” an “accident,” and not intentionally caused by the 
policyholder, lest insurers and society bear the moral hazard of allowing an 
insured to financially benefit40 from a destructive or harmful act of their 
own volition.41  Insuring such actions would (so the argument goes) 
increase the amount of harmful and illegal conduct as well as cause 
insurance premiums to increase for all policyholders.42 
1.  The “Occurrence” and Intentional Harm Provisions 
Liability insurers primarily guard against covering intentional harm 
through two policy provisions: (1) the requirement that there be an 
“occurrence”; and (2) and the intentional harm exclusion.43  The policy 
definition of an “occurrence” is largely consistent throughout the industry.  
For example, the standard ISO44 homeowners form covers “bodily injury 
                                                                                                                          
shooting death caused by another, regardless of intent.  These reporting discrepancies may distort 
firearm death and injury statistics.  Luo & McIntire, supra note 25. 
40 The benefit in a liability policy is typically the payment of defense costs and 
settlement/indemnity amounts for which the insured would otherwise be responsible. 
41 ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 14–17; 1 WILLARD PHILLIPS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
INSURANCE 608 (William S. Hein & Co. 4th ed., reprint 2006) (1854); WILLIAM R. VANCE, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF INSURANCE 64–65 (W. Publ’g Co. 2d ed., 1930); EMMETT J. VAUGHAN & 
THERESE M. VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 517 (10th ed. 2008). 
42 ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 14–17.  But see Sinclair Oil Co. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 682 P.2d 
975, 981 (Wyo. 1984) (“We know of no studies, statistics or proofs which indicate that contracts of 
insurance to protect against liability for punitive damages have a tendency to make willful or wanton 
misconduct more probable, nor do we know of any substantial relationship between the insurance 
coverage and such misconduct.”).  I discuss this issue in Section III.C.1. 
43 This exclusion is often referred to as the “intentional acts” exclusion.  This term is misleading, 
as usually it is intentionally caused harm or damage that triggers the exclusion, and not whether the act 
leading up to the harm was deliberate.   
44 ISO, formerly the Insurance Services Office, performs a variety of services for insurers, 
including serving as a statistical agent, collecting and correlating claim information to specific policy 
coverage, and drafting policy language (forms) and seeking approval from state regulators for their use.  
Overview of ISO Products and Services, ISO, http://www.iso.com/Products/Overview-of-ISO-
Products-and-Services/Overview-of-ISO-Products-and-Services.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).  
While many of the larger insurers draft and submit their own forms, they often draw heavily from ISO 
language.  ISO drafted language is utilized extensively for personal lines policies, as well as 
commercial general liability and commercial auto lines.  ISO’s Policy Language and Rules, ISO, 
http://www.iso.com/Products/Overview-of-ISO-Products-and-Services/ISO-s-Policy-Language-and-
Rules.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).   
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and property damage caused by an ‘occurrence,’” which is defined as “an 
accident.”45  “Accident” is not defined in most liability policies, but a large 
body of case law has addressed it—and often not consistently even within 
the same state.46  In Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Harvey,47 the Indiana 
Supreme Court ruled that intentionally pushing someone who then fell into 
the water and drowned could still be considered an “accident,” and thus an 
“occurrence,” if the fact finder determined that the insured did not intend 
the injury.48  In contrast, the Seventh Circuit previously held, based on its 
interpretation of Indiana law, that even absent intent to kill, there was no 
“occurrence” when the policyholder shot the victim on purpose.49  Perhaps 
these cases could be distinguished factually, but more relevantly, they help 
demonstrate that injuries caused by an intentional act often create coverage 
uncertainty based on the facts, policy language, choice of law, and judicial 
                                                                                                                          
45 ISO, HOMEOWNERS 3-SPECIAL FORM (HO 00 03 05 11) (2011) [hereinafter ISO HOMEOWNERS 
3 FORM].  ISO policy numbers identify the type of form.  Here, HO stands for homeowners, 03 is the 
designation for the “special form” policy which, despite its name, is the standard homeowners policy 
utilized in the United States, and 05 11 is the approximate date the policy was implemented (May 
2011).  A recent U.S. Government Accountability Office report summarizes the various ISO HO forms, 
noting that the ISO HO 03 is “the most commonly written policy.”  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO 14-179, HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE: MULTIPLE CHALLENGES MAKE EXPANDING 
PRIVATE COVERAGE DIFFICULT 4 tbl.1 (2014). 
State Farm, the largest homeowners insurer in the United States, defines occurrence as “an 
accident, including exposure to conditions, which results in: a. ‘bodily injury’ or b. ‘property damage.’”  
STATE FARM FIRE & CAS. CO., HOMEOWNERS POLICY 2 (1992), available at 
http://docs.nv.gov/doi/documents/home_policies/StateFarmForms/FP-7955.pdf [hereinafter STATE 
FARM HOMEOWNERS POLICY]; see also NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, 2012 TOP 25 GROUPS AND 
COMPANIES BY COUNTRYWIDE PREMIUM 2 (2013), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/resear
ch_top_25_market_share_pc.pdf (noting that State Farm has a 20.74% market share).  Thanks to the 
efforts of insurance regulators in Nevada and Missouri, personal lines policy forms from the major 
insurers in their states can be found on their websites.  Policy Forms Used by the 10 Largest 
Homeowners’ Insurance Groups in Nevada, NEV. DIV. INS., http://doi.nv.gov/Consumers/Homeowners
-Insurance/Policy-Forms/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2014); Homeowners Policies, MO. DEP’T INS., 
http://insurance.mo.gov/consumers/home/homeowners_policies.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).  As 
Professor Daniel Schwarcz notes, insurance contracts are typically not available to a policyholder until 
after the policy is purchased—and sometimes months later.  See Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating 
Standard Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263, 1319–23 (2011) (outlining the difficulties in 
obtaining pre-purchase access to policy forms).  Professor Schwarcz’s research and his advocacy 
before the National Association of Insurance Commissioners contributed to these initial regulatory 
efforts.  
46 “The difficulty in precisely defining the scope of coverage in liability policies providing 
coverage for ‘accidents’ is not a problem of recent vintage. . . . [F]ew insurance policy terms have 
‘provoked more controversy in litigation than the word ‘accident.’”  Koikos v. Travelers Ins. Co., 849 
So. 2d 263, 266 (Fla. 2003) (alterations in original) (quoting State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. CTC Dev. 
Corp., 720 So. 2d 1072, 1075 (Fla. 1998)).  
47 842 N.E.2d 1279 (Ind. 2006).   
48 Id. at 1285.  The insured’s involuntary manslaughter conviction only demonstrated the intent to 
cause an unlawful touching and not necessarily the desire to cause injury.  Id. at 1287.  
49 See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Morgan, 64 Fed. App’x 537, 540 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Her 
volitional acts of aiming the gun at Morgan and pulling the trigger were not accidents, and therefore are 
not covered under the Policy.  That she may not have intended to kill Morgan . . . is irrelevant.”). 
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interpretation.  This uncertainty is one reason why relying on liability 
insurance to cover intentional shootings is problematic, even absent an 
intent to kill or cause serious harm.50  
Almost all liability insurance policies have intentional harm 
exclusions.51  However, there is more variation in this language than there 
is for “occurrence.”  These differences carry important consequences for 
the coverage of allegedly intentional acts still considered “accidents” and, 
correspondingly, whether an “intentional” injury or death caused by a 
firearm will be covered—particularly for negligence claims against an 
insured arising out of a co-insured’s intentional conduct. 
To illustrate how minor differences in wording can lead to very 
different results, suppose Otto and Sophie are the parents of fourteen-year-
old Freddy.  Otto has a gun collection but is careless in locking it up and 
often leaves the firearms loaded.  One day Freddy has a friend over and 
they get into a bad argument.  In a fury, Freddy takes a pistol from the 
unlocked cabinet, yells “This is how serious I am!,” and shoots near his 
friend’s head, intending to fire a “warning shot” (or so he later claims).  
Unfortunately his aim is off and he hits and seriously wounds his now 
former friend.  The friend and his parents sue Freddy, Otto, and Sophie, 
who promptly notify their homeowners insurer, requesting coverage for the 
claim.  
Now, consider the likelihood that the family would be covered for this 
claim—which, if the injury is serious and the damages high, may also 
determine whether the shooting victim receives any financial 
compensation.  Otto, Sophie, and Freddy would all be considered insureds 
under both the most current ISO homeowners policy form, the ISO HO 00 
03 05 11, and a State Farm policy.52   
ISO’s “Expected or Intended Injury” exclusion states: 
Personal Liability . . . do[es] not apply to the following: 
 1.  Expected Or Intended Injury 
 “Bodily injury” or “property damage” which is expected or 
intended by an “insured”, even if the resulting “bodily 
injury” or “property damage”: 
                                                                                                                          
50 For a detailed review of case law in this area, see RINA CARMEL ET AL., ABA SECTION OF 
LITIG., CAUGHT IN THE CROSS FIRE: IMPACT OF COVERAGE ISSUES, DEFENSE ISSUES, AND FIREARM 
LEGISLATION FOR GUN CLAIMS, (2014), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ad
ministrative/litigation/materials/2014_inscle_materials/written_materials/p5_1_caught_in_the_crossfire
.authcheckdam.pdf. 
51 Baker & Farrish, supra note 14, at 299. 
52 The definition of “insured” includes the named insured (on the policy) and relatives of the 
insured who reside in the household.  ISO HOMEOWNERS 3 FORM, supra note 45, at 1; STATE FARM 
HOMEOWNERS POLICY, supra note 45, at 1.  
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 a. Is of a different kind, quality or degree than initially 
expected or intended; or 
 b. Is sustained by a different person, entity or property 
than initially expected or intended. 
However this Exclusion . . . does not apply to “bodily 
injury” or “property damage” resulting from the use of 
reasonable force by an “insured” to protect persons or 
property.53 
State Farm’s intentional harm exclusion is less detailed: 
 Coverage L (Personal Liability) and Coverage M  
 (Medical Payments to Others) do not apply to: 
  a.  bodily injury or property damage: 
 (1) which is either expected or intended by the 
 insured; or 
 (2) which is the result of willful and malicious acts of 
 the insured . . . .54 
In evaluating coverage for Freddie, an insurer utilizing ISO’s 
“expected or intended injury” exclusion would have a fair (though not 
conclusive) argument to successfully deny coverage for the shooting, even 
assuming Freddie was able to prove that he did not intend to hit and 
seriously injure his friend.  That exclusion applies not only to bodily injury 
specifically intended, but also injury that “is of a different kind, quality or 
degree than initially expected or intended.”55  This broad exclusion would 
allow the insurer to argue that the admittedly intentional act of shooting a 
loaded gun in close proximity to an individual during a heated argument 
triggers this exclusion, even though the bodily injury actually caused was 
of a “different kind, quality or degree” than anticipated.56  In contrast, 
assuming the policyholders successfully demonstrated Freddie only meant 
to scare his friend, State Farm would have a much more difficult time 
                                                                                                                          
53 ISO HOMEOWNERS 3 FORM, supra note 45, at 19.  Terms appearing within quotations are 
defined within the form.  Id. at 1–2. 
54 STATE FARM HOMEOWNERS POLICY, supra note 45, at 15–16.  The “willful and malicious acts 
of the insured” exclusionary clause could, of course, defeat coverage as well.  However, judicial 
interpretations on how and when it applies are mixed, and its applicability is uncertain, especially in 
cases involving minors, as well as actions that were not blatantly malicious.  See, e.g., Norris v. State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 16 S.W.3d 242, 244–46 (Ark. 2000) (finding exclusion was not applicable due 
to ambiguity); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Schwich, 749 N.W.2d 108, 113 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) 
(ruling that exclusion applied, but noting “[c]ases involving malicious acts are usually ‘factually more 
extreme,’: the actor knows or should have known that harm was substantially certain to result, but acts 
with a deliberate and calculated indifference to the risk of injury”). 
55 ISO HOMEOWNERS 3 FORM, supra note 45, at 19.  
56 The policyholder could, however, assert that no harm or injury of any type was intended. 
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demonstrating that the resulting harm was expected or intended. 
There is a further step.  If Otto and Sophie are sued under a negligence 
theory, say negligent supervision, the coverage results would also be 
different.  Under the ISO form, if Freddie is deemed to have intended the 
harm, as defined in the policy, then there is no coverage for any insured, 
since the exclusion uses the term “an insured.”57  Intentional harm 
“expected or intended” by one insured negates coverage for all insureds, 
regardless of whether their actions were only negligent.58  In contrast, the 
State Farm policy only excludes bodily injury “which is either expected or 
intended by the insured.”59  So, even if Freddie is not covered for his 
actions due to the intentional harm exclusion, the State Farm policy would 
still respond to negligence claims against his parents and possibly provide 
compensation to the victim.60 
Unfortunately, at least for policyholders and third party claimants, the 
more limited State Farm exclusion goes against the trend in homeowners 
policies of expanding the intentional harm exclusion, as we see with the 
ISO form.61  Among major carriers, Travelers, Nationwide, and The 
Hartford follow the ISO exclusion.62  Allstate excludes “bodily injury or 
                                                                                                                          
57 ISO HOMEOWNERS 3 FORM, supra note 45, at 19 (emphasis added).  
58 Id. 
59 STATE FARM HOMEOWNERS POLICY, supra note 45, at 16 (emphasis added). 
60 The importance of the “an insured’ (or any insured) versus “the insured” language is well 
recognized in case law.  See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Davis, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1134 (D. Haw. 
2006) (holding that Allstate need not indemnify or defend any other person other than “the insured”); 
Minkler v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 232 P.3d 612, 614 (Cal. 2010) (recognizing the differing opinions 
on “an insured” versus “the insured” with regards to a severability-of-interests provision); Catholic 
Diocese of Dodge City v. Raymer, 840 P.2d 456, 461–62 (Kan. 1992) (reviewing opinions concerning 
severability-of-interest provisions and concluding that exclusions are only applied to “the insured”); 
Co-operative Ins. Cos. v. Woodward, 45 A.3d 89, 94 (Vt. 2012) (discussing the language and policy 
differences between “an insured” and “the insured”); see also Hazel Glenn Beh, Tort Liability for 
Intentional Acts of Family Members: Will Your Insurer Stand by You?, 68 TENN. L. REV. 1, 33–36 
(2000) (discussing distinctions between “an,” “any,” and “the” insured). 
61 The last ISO homeowners form to contain the more limited exclusion similar to that used in 
State Farm was its HO 00 03 04 91, which was implemented in April 1991.  In three subsequent 
forms—HO 00 03 10 00 (October 2000), HO 00 03 05 01 (May 2001), and HO 00 03 05 11 (May 
2011)—ISO has utilized the intentional harm exclusion cited above.  The American Association of 
Insurance Services (“AAIS”), an ISO competitor that also develops policy forms, contains an 
international harm exclusion in its homeowners policy that is at least as expansive as the ISO’s.  AAIS 
HOMEOWNERS PROGRAM (policy form on file with author).  Though a discussion of this issue is 
outside the scope of this Article, the expansion of the intentional harm exclusion mirrors other changes 
in personal lines policies that are circumscribing coverage in some important areas, but usually not 
noticed or commented on by even diligent readers of their own policies or other commentators.  
Schwarcz, supra note 45, at 1303–08.  
62 See TRAVELERS, HOMEOWNERS SPECIAL FORM HO-3 (06-06), at 19 (2006) [hereinafter 
TRAVELERS HOMEOWNERS POLICY], available at http://docs.nv.gov/doi/documents/home_policies/Tra
velersForms/Travelers_HO-3.pdf (employing the term “an ‘insured’”); NATIONWIDE, HOMEOWNERS 3 
FORM (HO 3 (01 00)), at 21 (2000), available at http://insurance.mo.gov/consumers/home/documents/
HO3-0100-01.pdf (same); THE HARTFORD, HOMEOWNERS 3 SPECIAL FORM (HO 00 03 10 00), at 17 
(2000), available at http://docs.nv.gov/doi/documents/home_policies/HartfordForms/Hartford_HO_00
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property damage intended by, or which may reasonably be expected to 
result from the intentional or criminal acts or omissions of, any insured 
person,” and contains the ISO “different kind or degree than intended” 
language.63  USAA and Liberty Mutual utilize language very similar to 
Allstate’s, and the “foreseeable result” and “reasonably expected” 
additions in their policies expand the intentional harm exclusion and 
provide additional grounds for the insurer to deny coverage.64  Zurich, 
through its Farmers Insurance subsidiary, goes even further.65 
This brief discussion of intentional harm exclusions shows that 
standard personal lines liability policies: (1) exclude intentionally caused 
                                                                                                                          
_03_10_00.pdf (same).  Travelers, Nationwide, and The Hartford hold approximately 4.39%, 3.75%, 
and 1.42% of the homeowners market in the United States, respectively.  NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. 
COMM’RS, supra note 45, at 2.  
63 ALLSTATE INDEMNITY CO., STANDARD HOMEOWNERS POLICY AP783, at 16, 
available at http://docs.nv.gov/doi/documents/home_policies/AllStateForms/AP783.pdf.  Allstate has 
approximately 9.12% of the homeowners market in the United States.  NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, 
supra note 45, at 2.  
64 See USAA, HOMEOWNERS 3R(02) SPECIAL FORM (07-08), at 24 (2008) [hereinafter USAA 
HOMEOWNERS POLICY], available at http://docs.nv.gov/doi/documents/home_policies/USAAForms/H
O-3R(02)(07-08).pdf (using “reasonably expected”); LIBERTY MUTUAL, SAFECO HOMEOWNERS 
POLICY (HOMC-7030/EP 1/09), at 14 (2009), [hereinafter LIBERTY MUTUAL HOMEOWNERS POLICY], 
available at http://docs.nv.gov/doi/documents/home_policies/LibertyMutualForms/HOM-7030.pdf 
(using “foreseeable result”).  The market share for USAA and Liberty Mutual is 4.91% and 5.89%, 
respectively.  NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, supra note 45, at 2. 
65 See ZURICH, FARMERS NEXT GENERATION HOMEOWNERS POLICY NEVADA                                   
(56-5544 1ST ED. 7-06), at 38 (2006) [hereinafter ZURICH HOMEOWNERS POLICY], available at 
http://docs.nv.gov/doi/documents/home_policies/ZurichForms/56-5544-1st.pdf (listing such coverage 
exclusions as mistaken beliefs, intentional acts, and failure to act).  Zurich has 6.22% of the market, 
largely through Farmers.  NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, supra note 45, at 2.  The exclusion is so 
broad it is worth setting out:  
We do not cover bodily injury, property damage or personal injury which is caused 
by, arises out of, or is the result of an intentional act by or at the direction of any 
insured.  By way of example this includes but is not limited to any intentional act or 
intentional failure to act by any insured, whether a criminal act or otherwise, where 
resulting injury or damage would be objectively expected to a high degree of 
likelihood, even if not subjectively intended or expected.  This exclusion applies 
even if: 
a. any insured mistakenly believes he or she has the right to engage in certain 
conduct; 
b. the injury or damage is sustained by persons or property not intended or expected 
by any insured; 
c. the injury or damage is different or greater or of a different quality than that 
intended or expected; 
d. any insured did not understand that injury or damage may result; or 
e. any insured knew the intentional act or failure to act was a violation of any penal 
law, whether or not an insured is actually charged with or convicted of a crime. 
ZURICH HOMEOWNERS POLICY, supra, at 38.  
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harm (often even if the harm that occurred was “of a different kind, quality 
or degree” than the harm initially expected, if any); and (2) are likely to 
exclude derivative negligence claims against other insureds whose policies 
otherwise might provide a legal defense to the policyholder and a source of 
compensation to the victims.  Based on 2012 market data compiled by the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”), the eight 
insurers mentioned above write approximately 56% of the nation’s 
homeowners insurance market.66  State Farm, the largest personal lines 
insurer in the country, possesses 20.7% of the homeowners insurance 
market.67 
2.  The Uncertainty of Self-Defense Provisions  
The self-defense exception to the intentional harm exclusion is one of 
the few current areas where liability insurance could fulfill its hoped-for 
role in financially protecting policyholders and compensating victims shot 
in alleged acts of self-defense.68  This coverage is limited, though, for 
several reasons.69   
First, the exception is not found in all homeowners policies.  Five of 
the ten policies discussed in the previous section contain a self-defense 
                                                                                                                          
66 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, supra note 45, at 2.  Presumably, many of the insurers who 
write the rest of the homeowners market also utilize ISO’s intentional harm exclusion, or a similarly 
broad one.   
67 Id. 
68 An “exception” to an exclusion brings back some of the coverage the exclusion would 
otherwise eliminate.  For example, an insured who intentionally caused harm in a legitimate act of self-
defense would not be excluded from coverage due to the intentional harm exclusion.  ISO’s exception 
states: “However this Exclusion E.1 [Intentional Harm] does not apply to ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property 
damage’ resulting from the use of reasonable force by an ‘insured’ to protect persons or property.”  ISO 
HOMEOWNERS 3 FORM, supra note 45, at 19.  
69 The existence of statutory or common law self-defense laws as a defense to criminal 
prosecution does not dictate insurance coverage, which is governed (in part) by the language of the 
policy and the applicability of its contractual intentional harm exclusion.  See State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co. v. Marshall, 554 So. 2d 504, 505 (Fla. 1989) (“The intent underlying an act of self-defense where 
the defender intends to harm the attacker is identical to that underlying an assault.  In each, the actor 
intends to inflict harm on the other. . . . The difference between the two lies in the motive or purpose 
governing the act; the motive for one is worthy, that for the other is not.  Nevertheless, such acts of 
self-defense are undeniably intentional and have been held to be embraced within intentional act 
exclusions by a majority of courts.”); see also Coop. Fire Ins. Ass’n of Vt. v. Bizon, 693 A.2d 722, 728 
(Vt. 1997) (holding that “intent” is a complex term and does not necessarily include harmful acts).  
Some courts have disagreed with this analysis and ruled that intentional harm caused by a lawful use of 
self-defense can constitute an “accident” and not trigger the intentional injury exclusion despite the 
absence of a self-defense exception in the policy.  See, e.g., Vt. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Walukiewicz, 966 A.2d 
672, 682 (Conn. 2009) (“Accordingly we conclude that the intentional injury exclusion does not 
preclude coverage for injuries resulting from legitimate acts of self-defense because those injuries were 
not expected or intended by the insured.”).  For a discussion of how courts interpret self-defense claims 
in the face of intentional harm exclusions, see generally John Dwight Ingram, The Expected or 
Intended Exclusion in Liability Insurance: What About Self-Defense?, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 123 
(2009). 
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exception.70  Second, standard homeowners policies do not cover any costs 
associated with defending against criminal charges.71  Third, even when 
present in the policy, the exception’s applicability will often be uncertain 
as it will depend upon the policy language, the facts of the shooting, and 
state law on the use of self-defense in criminal cases, as well as the claim 
adjuster’s assessment of how these issues apply.72  As with varying judicial 
definitions of “accident,”73 these ambiguities will often leave the 
policyholder, insurer, and victim uncertain about the scope of insurance 
coverage. 
Perhaps because of these limitations, several insurers offer specialized 
liability products for gun owners.  This market has attracted increased 
attention from gun owners and the media.74  The NRA endorses an 
insurance program through broker Lockton Affinity, which administers a 
number of gun-related insurance products, including self-defense coverage, 
excess personal liability insurance, and coverage for gun shops and gun 
shows.75  The self-defense endorsement to Lockton’s excess personal 
liability insurance provides coverage for “‘bodily injury’ or ‘property 
damage’ caused by the use of a ‘legally possessed firearm’ by the 
Individual Insured Member while engaged in an ‘act of self-defense.’”76  
Self-defense is defined as actions authorized by state law.77  There are two 
                                                                                                                          
70 The ISO, AAIS, Travelers, USAA, and Liberty Mutual policy forms contain self-defense 
exceptions.  ISO HOMEOWNERS 3 FORM, supra note 45, at 19; AAIS, supra note 61; TRAVELERS 
HOMEOWNERS POLICY, supra note 62, at 19; USAA HOMEOWNERS POLICY, supra note 64, at 24; 
LIBERTY MUTUAL HOMEOWNERS POLICY, supra note 64, at 14.  The State Farm, Nationwide, The 
Hartford, Allstate, and Zurich, policy forms do not.  
71 E.g., USAA HOMEOWNERS POLICY, supra note 64, at 24.  
72 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Justice, 493 S.E.2d 532, 535–36 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that 
the facts of the underlying case were sufficient for a jury to find that the insured triggered his policy’s 
self-defense exception, despite the insurer’s argument that the facts actually supported a finding of 
“mutual combat”). 
73 See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text. 
74 See Stephanie K. Jones, Interest in Personal Gun Liability Insurance Protection Increasing, 
INS. J. (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2013/04/11/288010.htm 
(discussing the increased availability of personal gun liability insurance); Jay MacDonald, Gun Owners 
Seek Out Self Defense Insurance, BANKRATE (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/insuran
ce/gun-owners-seek-self-defense-insurance.aspx (discussing advocates’ increased calls for gun liability 
insurance). 
75 Insurance for NRA Members, LOCKTON AFFINITY, http://www.locktonrisk.com/nrains/member
s.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).  A Lloyd’s syndicate underwrites the coverage and provides the 
actual insurance.  LLOYD’S, PERSONAL FIREARMS LIABILITY INSURANCE: POLICY FORM (2013), 
[hereinafter LLOYD’S LIABILITY INSURANCE FORM], available at http://www.locktonrisk.com/nrains/fo
rms/Self-Defense_Certificate_of_Insurance.pdf.  The policy states it is excess to any other liability 
policy providing coverage.  Id. § I.A. 
76 LLOYD’S LIABILITY INSURANCE FORM, supra note 75, amend. § VII.A.  
77 See id. amend. § X.P (“‘Act of self-defense’ shall mean the act of defending one’s person, or 
other persons who may be threatened, or one’s property by the actual or threatened use of a ‘legally 
possessed firearm’ as may be authorized by an applicable local, state or federal laws of the state or 
jurisdiction within which the ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ occurs.  ‘Act of self-defense’ 
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separate aspects of coverage: (1) the standard insuring agreement for civil 
actions, which includes a duty to defend; and (2) reimbursement for 
criminal defense costs up to the policy limits, but only if either the charges 
are dropped or the insured is acquitted “due to an ‘act of self-defense.’”78  
The insurance application allows the policyholder to select policy limits 
from $100,000 to $1,000,000.79   
III.  INSURING INTENTIONAL HARM AND CRIMINAL ACTS 
If standard liability policies would only rarely respond to wrongful 
deaths and injuries caused by firearms, where does this leave us?  States 
could either encourage or require liability insurers to cover what they 
currently exclude under their standard policies: bodily injury intentionally 
caused by firearms.  This approach suggests four scenarios: (1) insurers 
voluntarily offer coverage and gun owners are required to obtain it; 
(2) insurers are required to offer this coverage in specific policies (e.g., 
homeowners policies) and gun owners are required to obtain it; (3) insurers 
are required to offer coverage, but purchase is optional for gun owners; 
(4) insurers voluntarily offer coverage and purchase is optional for gun 
owners.  Each scenario presents problems; options (3) and (4), in which 
gun owners are not required to obtain insurance, are functionally 
comparable due to moral hazard and adverse selection issues discussed 
below.  
A.  Insurers Voluntarily Covering Intentional Harm 
Market-based solutions are usually preferable to mandating insurance 
coverage, particularly if many insurers and potential policyholders would 
be hostile to such coverage requirements.  However, there appears to be 
little interest among insurers to expand liability coverage for gun-related 
injuries outside of certain specialty insurance products offered to gun 
owners and gun clubs, such as enhanced self-defense coverage.80  This is 
not surprising.  As noted above, homeowners policies already cover some 
negligence claims involving the use of firearms, though it is increasingly 
unlikely that a policy would cover a negligence claim if another insured 
under the policy intentionally harmed the claimant (as determined by state 
insurance coverage law, not tort law).  Many policies, though certainly not 
                                                                                                                          
includes the rendering of emergency assistance solely at the request of a uniformed law enforcement 
officer.”). 
78 Id. amend. §§ VII.A–B, XIII. 
79 The yearly premiums range from $165.00 ($100,000 limit) to $600.00 ($1,000,000 limit).  
Reimbursement for “Criminal Defense Expenses” require limits of $500,000 or $1,000,000.  NRA Self-
Defense Insurance, LOCKTON AFFINITY, http://www.locktonrisk.com/nrains/defense.htm (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2014).   
80 See supra text accompanying notes 75–79. 
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all, also contain a self-defense exception to the intentional harm 
exclusion.81  Insurance coverage for criminal prosecutions is rare, at least 
for personal lines policies.82  If there is an increase in coverage demands 
for gun-related injuries, especially if accompanied by court decisions 
favorable to policyholders, we are more likely to see explicit exclusions for 
gun related injuries rather than increased coverage.83   
Financial or actuarial risk is another obstacle for insurers in 
underwriting coverage for firearm-related claims arising out of willful acts.  
Insurers need sufficient data to estimate claim frequency and a range of 
damage awards to establish adequate rates.84  This type of coverage would 
be new and insurers would not have the quantity and quality of information 
they typically rely on in underwriting liability policies.  Further, insurers’ 
actuarial ability to underwrite this coverage accurately using risk-based 
rate structures does not guarantee that they would be allowed to charge the 
premiums desired.  Rate regulation remains an essential component of 
insurance regulation in many states, particularly in personal lines.85  There 
is a sufficient history of regulatory rate suppression to create legitimate 
concerns that insurers would not be allowed to charge sufficient premiums 
to cover losses,86 especially when access to firearms involves both 
constitutional rights and fervent advocacy by gun-rights organizations.  
Though regulatory rate suppression for firearm liability insurance may 
make it cheaper and therefore more palatable for gun owners, it would 
reduce or defeat insurers’ ability to price for risk, one of the primary 
objectives of mandating liability insurance.  
While these concerns are real, they need not be significant obstacles.  
                                                                                                                          
81 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.  
82 See Tom Baker, Liability Insurance at the Tort-Crime Boundary, in FAULT LINES: TORT LAW 
AS CULTURAL PRACTICE 66, 70 (David M. Engel & Michael McCann eds., 2009) (“[A]lthough liability 
insurance contracts provide broad defense and indemnity coverage for tort proceedings and tort 
damages, they typically do not provide defense coverage for criminal proceedings, and, to my 
knowledge, they never provide any coverage for criminal fines or penalties.”). 
83 See Missing the Target, Gun Insurance Proposals Overlook Important Realities of the Risks, 
VIEWPOINT, Winter 2013, at 3, 7 (“In any event, if liability insurers reconsider their exposure to gun 
violence in any fundamental sense, they are more likely to reduce that exposure, not expand it.”). 
84 See Baker & Farrish, supra note 14, at 298 (“The core analytical task of an insurance enterprise 
is identifying future losses, . . . estimating their frequency and magnitude, . . . and then deciding how 
much to charge to which classes of people in return for this protection.”). 
85 See, e.g., FED. INS. OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, HOW TO MODERNIZE AND IMPROVE 
THE SYSTEM OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 54–55 (2013). 
86 See ABRAHAM, supra note 19, at 129 (“[I]nsurers are always concerned about the prospect that 
their rates will be regulated in a manner that denies them what they regard as a fair profit.”); Steven W. 
Pottier & Robert C. Witt, On the Demand for Liability Insurance: An Insurance Economics 
Perspective, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1681, 1700 (1994) (“[Insurance] affordability concerns have led to rate 
suppression in many states and, as a consequence, have led to availability problems.”); see also State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. New Jersey, 590 A.2d 191 (N.J. 1991) (noting that a provision of the Fair 
Automobile Insurance Reform Act that prohibited insurers from directly passing surcharges and 
assessments on to policyholders was not an unconstitutional taking).  
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First, insurers would have access to a large amount of public information 
collected by public safety agencies and other groups concerning incidents 
of firearm use, the type of firearms used, whether criminal charges were 
filed, and some approximation of the injuries caused.87  And while insurers 
may have little experience in adjusting liability claims arising out of 
intentional shootings, the causes of action and types of damages available 
to claimants would be very familiar (e.g., medical treatment, lost income, 
pain and suffering, loss of consortium).  Second, insurers could use 
standard risk mitigation practices to limit their liability, for example, 
through the use of a sublimit, capping insurer liability at a lower limit than 
available in the policy as a whole, or by narrowing the scope of liability 
itself through additional exclusions.88  Third, insurers often do write new 
products in the absence of significant underwriting data, if they perceive 
there is an economic incentive to do so.89 
Unfortunately, there seems to be little profit in the enterprise, even if 
insurers do surmount these hurdles.  Given that Second Amendment and 
gun rights issues are volatile areas for many individuals and organizations, 
providing insurance coverage for the product could interject these insurers 
into a political and social debate they likely would want to avoid—costing 
them policyholders in otherwise profitable areas, such as standard 
homeowners and automobile insurance.  Finally, even if these issues were 
successfully addressed (or willing to be risked), the likely underwriting 
profit would be small90 and arguably not worth the time to develop the 
product, obtain regulatory approval,91 educate insurance producers, litigate 
the inevitable challenges, and face the reputational risks it could entail.  
                                                                                                                          
87 This assumption can be tested through a much more thorough review of the information 
available and an evaluation of what underwriting assumptions could be accurately drawn from this 
data.  At present, critics argue that firearms injury data is not comprehensive or is otherwise flawed.  
See supra note 25.  Moreover, there are likely political and perhaps legal problems with expanding 
research in this area and allowing private insurers access to some of the data.   
88 See 12 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 180:15 (3d ed. 2005) (“Insurers frequently specify a maximum 
amount that is reasonable under the policy . . . .”). 
89 Tom Baker, The Shifting Terrain of Risk and Uncertainty on the Liability Insurance Field, 60 
DEPAUL L. REV. 521, 529–31 (2011).   
90 Commentators have offered premium estimates falling within the range of $20 to $57.  See 
Stephen G. Gilles & Nelson Lund, Mandatory Liability Insurance for Firearm Owners: Design 
Choices and Second Amendment Limits, 14 ENGAGE 18, 23 (2013) (estimating a baseline premium of 
$20 per year for the average firearm owner); Tom Harvey, Gun Insurance Would Not Be Expensive, 
GUN INS. BLOG (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.guninsuranceblog.com/gun-insurance-would-not-be-
expensive/ (estimating an average premium of $57.15 per year, per gun).  
91 Depending on the state, insurers may need to obtain regulatory approval from the state 
insurance department when introducing a new coverage.  State Insurance Regulation: History, Purpose 
and Structure, NAIC, http://www.naic.org/documents/consumer_state_reg_brief.pdf (last visited Apr. 
15, 2014).   
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B.  Optional Purchase of Insurance Coverage  
Giving gun owners the option to purchase liability insurance that 
would cover intentional harm could reduce the furor that compulsory 
coverage would provoke, but it creates severe adverse selection problems.  
Few gun owners would likely purchase an endorsement that would cover 
future acts that, under criminal law, could be classified as homicides or 
assaults with a deadly weapon—or perhaps more important, insurers would 
not want to sell to those individuals who selectively believed they might 
need this coverage during the policy period.  This problem would exist 
regardless of whether the insurer was required to offer the product or just 
authorized and encouraged to do so.92  Insurers could also face another 
traditional adverse selection issue,93 where the riskiest homeowners/gun 
owners could constitute a growing majority in an underwriting pool.  Their 
(likely) greater claim frequency would drive the premiums upwards and 
further discourage its purchase by low-risk insureds, which could cause a 
higher loss ratio, creating even higher premiums and driving even more 
low-risk insureds out of the market.   
C.  Mandatory Offer and Purchase 
Compulsory coverage for injuries caused by illegal use of firearms 
addresses some of these problems.  Insurers would presumably not be a 
significant focus of gun owner anger if the law required them to offer the 
coverage—or at least not after public furor died down.  The moral hazard 
and adverse selection issues associated with optional purchase of this 
coverage would be significantly lessened since all gun owners would be 
required to purchase this coverage.94 
What if a state required liability insurers to cover intentional 
shootings?  Leaving aside for a moment the wisdom of such legislation 
(and Second Amendment issues), states would likely have the legal 
authority to mandate this coverage, at least absent express federal 
legislation preempting such laws.  States have broad powers to regulate 
insurance, an area of traditional state concern.95  The McCarran-Ferguson 
                                                                                                                          
92 There is an argument for gun owners to purchase enhanced liability insurance to cover self-
defense claims, since not every insurer provides a self-defense exception in intentional harm exclusions 
and even for those that do, insurers may still dispute coverage on the facts of specific cases.  See Gilles 
& Lund, supra note 90, at 19 (“Given the vagaries of self-defense law and the uncertainty over how a 
jury will evaluate a colorable claim of self-defense, some gun owners could benefit from enhanced self-
defense liability coverage . . . .”); supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text. 
93 See 1 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 88, § 1:3 (defining adverse selections as “the 
statistical phenomenon of people with higher than average risk seeking insurance more often than 
people of average or below average risk”). 
94 For a discussion of some specific concerns relating to moral hazard, see infra Part III.C.1. 
95 Id. § 2:2. 
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Act96 reaffirms this right, and establishes that state laws related to the 
“business of insurance” will not be preempted by implication.97  Some 
states would also need to amend or repeal statutory prohibitions against 
insurance coverage for intentional acts or harm, which would not be an 
obstacle to state legislatures who wish to mandate this coverage for gun 
owners.98   
Opponents have raised many objections to requiring this coverage.  I 
do not believe most of them are sustainable and addressed some of the 
various problems above.  The following two subsections focus on two 
major objections: (1) insurance cannot cover intentional harm; and 
(2) insurers would not offer insurance covering intentional gun violence.  
1.  Insurance Does Not Cover Illegal Acts 
As expected, insurers oppose providing coverage for intentional harm 
caused by a firearm.99  Dr. Robert Hartwig, President of the Insurance 
Information Institute, stated: “Insurers don’t cover illegal acts, ever, 
period.”100   
Yet, insurers often do.  A prime example is coverage for driving while 
intoxicated.  Personal lines automobile policies do not exclude bodily 
injury or property damage when the policyholder is driving under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of law.101  These policies do 
exclude intentional harm, but there is no exclusion for criminal acts as 
there are in several of the homeowners policies mentioned earlier.102  The 
                                                                                                                          
96 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012–1015 (2012). 
97 Id. § 1012(a)–(b); see Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 427–28 (2003) (“[T]he 
business of insurance shall be recognized as a subject of state regulation, which will be good against 
preemption by federal legislation unless that legislation specifically relates to the business of 
insurance.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Zurich Ins. PLC, 
685 F.3d 376, 380 (4th Cir. 2012) (observing that the McCarran-Ferguson Act authorizes “‘reverse 
preemption’ of generally applicable federal statutes by state laws enacted for the purpose of regulating 
the business of insurance”); Life Partners, Inc. v. Morrison, 484 F.3d 284, 291–95 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(describing Congress’s purpose in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act). 
98 See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 2013) (“An insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the 
willful act of the insured; but he is not exonerated by the negligence of the insured, or of the insured’s 
agents or others.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 47 (West 2013) (“[N]o company may insure 
any person against legal liability for causing injury . . . by his deliberate or intentional crime or 
wrongdoing . . . .”).  
99 See Cavanaugh, supra note 4 (“[T]he industry knows one thing: illegal acts cannot be 
insured.”).  
100 Jones, supra note 74 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
101 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 82, at 74 n.10 (“[T]he overwhelmingly compensatory purpose of 
compulsory automobile liability insurance has prevented automobile insurance companies from putting 
drunk driving exclusions in their policies.”); Avi Perry, Restructuring Insurance Coverage for Drunk 
Drivers, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 427, 431 (2010) (“[N]o Connecticut automobile insurance policy 
reviewed . . . contained an exclusion for injuries or damages arising as a result of drunk driving.”).  
102 Perry, supra note 101, at 431; see supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.  The intentional 
harm exclusion in ISO auto policies is limited.  See ISO, PERSONAL AUTO POLICY FORM 
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likely reason for this coverage is that legislators and regulators would not 
allow insurers to add a driving while intoxicated (DWI) or criminal act 
exclusion because of the numerous deaths and injuries that occur each year 
by impaired drivers.103  Exclusions for intoxicated driving would eliminate 
a major source of financial contribution to victims harmed by this 
behavior, thus defeating a primary purpose of liability insurance.104  We 
also know that the minimum liability limits required under state motor 
vehicle financial responsibility laws are not sufficient to compensate for 
serious bodily injuries.105 
Professional liability policies, such as Errors & Omissions and 
Directors & Officers coverages, exclude intentionally dishonest, criminal, 
and similar acts, but typically the insurer may only deny coverage on this 
ground if the fraud is actually proven.106  Until then, the policy requires the 
insurer to defend the policyholder or reimburse defense costs.107  For 
example, a typical Directors & Officers policy excludes: 
[A]ny Claim . . . alleging, based upon, arising out of, or 
attributable to any deliberately fraudulent or deliberately 
criminal act, error or omission.  However, this exclusion shall 
not apply unless and until there is a final adjudication against 
                                                                                                                          
(PP 00 01 01 05), at 3 (2003), available at http://www.sba.muohio.edu/adelmasw/classes/Policies/01-
09%20PersonalAutoPolicyPP00010105.pdf (“We do not provide Liability Coverage for any 
‘insured’ . . . [w]ho intentionally causes ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage.’”). 
103 See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., ALCOHOL IMPAIRED DRIVING 1 (2012), 
available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811606.pdf (noting that in 2010 over 10,000 people 
were killed in alcohol-impaired motor vehicle accidents, accounting for approximately one-third of the 
total motor vehicle traffic death toll).  
104 See Baker, supra note 82, at 74 n.10 (“[T]he overwhelmingly compensatory purpose of 
compulsory automobile liability insurance has prevented automobile insurance companies from putting 
drunk driving exclusion in their policies.”); Perry, supra note 101, at 432 (“If a drunk driving exclusion 
were permitted, many tort victims would be either undercompensated or wholly uncompensated for 
their injuries since drivers typically have shallower pockets than do insurers.”).  Critics of this regime 
that allows for DWI-related coverage may argue “that the gap between the criminal and civil 
consequences of illegal conduct should be narrow, if not nonexistent.”  Id. at 427.  Professor Gary 
Schwartz notes a potential shared theoretical justification in tort law and liability insurance: “[T]he 
many scholars who unqualifiedly assert that liability insurance is inconsistent with fairness theories of 
tort law are guilty of ignoring . . . the possibility that compensatory justice is the theory that tort law 
has in mind—a theory that renders liability insurance not only acceptable but commendable.”  Gary T. 
Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 335 
(1990).  
105 Most states require auto liability insurance in the $20,000 to $25,000 range (per person, which 
doubles the total amount), though some states go as high as $50,000 in minimum liability limits.  State-
by-State Minimum Coverage Requirements, supra note 20.  
106 9A COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 88, § 131:16; 14 id. § 201:59. 
107 14 Id. § 201:59. 
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any Insured as to such conduct.108 
On a practical level, this requirement is often tantamount to coverage, 
since these cases are rarely tried to conclusion and judicial resolution of 
any fraud allegations is unlikely.109  Further, insurance coverage for 
defense costs can bring in substantial financial resources to a case and 
serve as one source of compensation for reaching settlement.110  These 
exclusions are underwritten and priced with the knowledge that intentional 
fraud allegations alone will not defeat insurance coverage.111 
Similar coverage is available even for allegations of criminal acts 
causing significant physical and emotional injury, such as physical and 
sexual abuse.  As an illustration, Hanover Insurance offers professional 
liability insurance for human service agencies that includes optional 
endorsements covering civil liability for “Physical and Sexual Abuse 
Coverage” (to protect the agency) and “Innocent Party Defense Coverage” 
(to protect agency employees).112  A separate endorsement reimburses the 
agency for defense costs it pays to employees charged with criminal acts, 
but only if the charges are dismissed or the employee acquitted.113 
First party property insurance typically provides coverage to 
individuals and entities who are  “innocent co-insureds.”  For example, 
mortgage lenders do not lose their coverage (often as an “additional 
insured”) on properties in which they have maintained a security interest 
even when a borrower/insured intentionally damages or destroys the 
                                                                                                                          
108 ACE ADVANTAGE, MANAGEMENT PROTECTION POLICY (PF-18880), at 5 (2005),         
available at http://www.acegroup.com/us-en/assets/ace-advantage-management-protection-policy-for-
public-companies.pdf. 
109 Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance and 
Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 776–77 (2009). 
110 See id. at 760–61, n.19 (noting that Directors and Officers liability policies “typically cover 
amounts paid in settlements as well as defense costs”). 
111 Errors & Omissions policies contain similar provisions.  See, e.g., BEAZLEY INS. CO., 
LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY (F00020), at 5 (2008), available at 
https://www.beazley.com/forms_and_resources_search_page.html?business=164&type=1565 (select 
“Lawyers” from the first drop-down menu, “Wordings/policies” from the second drop-down menu, 
then follow “Lawyers_PL_Ins_Policy.pdf”) (“The coverage under this Policy does not apply to 
Damages or Claims Expenses in connection with or resulting from any Claim . . . arising out of or 
resulting from any criminal, dishonest, fraudulent or malicious act, error or omission of any Insured; 
however, this Policy shall apply to Claims Expenses incurred in defending any such Claim alleging the 
foregoing until such time as there is a final adjudication, judgment, binding arbitration decision or 
conviction against the Insured, or admission by the Insured, establishing such criminal, dishonest, 
fraudulent or malicious conduct, or a plea of nolo contendere or no contest regarding such alleged 
conduct, at which time the Insured shall reimburse the Underwriter for all Claims Expenses incurred 
defending the Claim and the Underwriter shall have no further liability for Claims Expenses.”).  
112 HANOVER INS. GRP., PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, GENERAL LIABILITY, AND ABUSE & 
MOLESTATION COVERAGE 6 (2008), available at http://www.hanover.com/linec/docs/115-1066.pdf. 
113 See id. at 4 (stating that reimbursement for criminal defense fees is limited to $25,000). 
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property (e.g., through arson).114 
Numerous courts have held that innocent insureds, such as spouses, are 
entitled to coverage even if their co-insured intentionally set fire to a home 
or other property, regardless of whether the insurance policy itself excludes 
intentional acts caused by “any” or “an” insured.115  These cases are often 
based on policy language that is inconsistent with statutory requirements 
for standard fire policies, which apply to first party property coverages in 
both homeowner and commercial policies.116  The existence and 
enforcement of these requirements protects individuals, especially victims 
of domestic abuse, whose co-insured (e.g., a spouse or partner) 
intentionally commits arson, perhaps as retaliation for acrimonious divorce 
or separation proceedings.117 
So insurers, either by public policy or by choice and market demands, 
often insure illegal and intentional acts, despite the moral hazards inherent 
in doing so.  This is not surprising given the multiple roles that liability 
insurance plays, such as protecting policyholder assets, compensating 
injured parties, and promoting safer practices—whether in driving a 
vehicle, designing and manufacturing products, or providing services. 
While moral hazard concerns for insuring intentionally caused harm 
are legitimate,118 in practice it is unlikely that insurance coverage for 
intentional shootings would encourage additional gun violence even by 
reducing the financial costs of such actions.  First, policyholders already 
face substantial criminal penalties far more severe than any exacted 
through civil litigation.  Second, there are significant normative, personal, 
and psychological barriers to intentionally shooting someone (particularly 
a family member) that are presumably a far greater deterrent for most 
                                                                                                                          
114 See ISO HOMEOWNERS 3 FORM, supra note 45, at 15 (“If we deny your claim, that denial will 
not apply to a valid claim of the mortgagee . . . .”). 
115 See, e.g., Nangle v. Farmers Ins. Co., 73 P.3d 1252, 1257–58 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing 
the possible recovery of an innocent co-insured if she did not know that her husband had set the fire); 
Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Kirsling, 73 P.3d 102, 106–07 (Idaho 2003) (holding that a fire insurance 
policy could not provide less coverage to an innocent co-insured than that which would have been 
afforded under her standard policy); Sager v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 680 N.W.2d 8, 14 (Iowa 
2004) (discussing the unenforceability of intentional loss provision in fire insurance policy).  
116 See Century-Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Garcia, 246 P.3d 621, 625–27 (Cal. 2011) (surveying cases 
holding that fire policies excluding coverage for an innocent co-insured were unenforceable because 
they undermined statutorily mandated coverage). 
117 VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 41, at 466; Melody S. Mosley, Arson and Innocent Co-
Insureds: Homeowners Coverage Analysis, PROP. CASUALTY 360 (Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.property
casualty360.com/2012/11/06/arson-and-innocent-co-insureds-homeowners-coverage. 
118 “Somewhat loosely speaking, moral hazard is the tendency of insurance to diminish an 
insured’s incentives to take care that would reduce the risk being insured against.”  Tom Baker & Peter 
Siegelman, The Law and Economics of Liability Insurance: A Theoretical and Empirical Review, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 169, 169 n.3 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2013); see also 
Rick Swedloff, Uncompensated Torts, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 721, 762–66 (2012) (discussing moral 
hazard). 
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people than the risk of being sued.119  These deterrents would remain and 
when they are not sufficient to prevent an intentional shooting, it is 
difficult to imagine that civil liability for harm caused by an intentional 
shooting provides any real additional deterrence to an individual’s decision 
to shoot another person.120  Further, an important goal of mandating this 
coverage is to leverage insurers’ loss prevention abilities and, through risk-
based pricing, encourage gun owners to store firearms in a safer manner—
thus reducing the use of guns in suicides, domestic violence, and other 
situations where such use was not premeditated. 
Insurers have long addressed moral hazard concerns through “contract 
design,” which provides policyholders financial incentives (or penalties) to 
minimize insured losses, and also thereby reducing the financial 
consequences of insuring these risks for insurers.121  These tools include 
deductibles, policy limits, and experience ratings, as well as providing sub-
limits on particular risks and narrowly drawing specific coverages or 
exclusions.  These practices are designed to give policyholders a financial 
stake in managing their insured risks and would play a similar role here. 
2.  Insurers Might Refuse to Write the Coverage 
If insurers would have minimal economic incentive to voluntarily offer 
this coverage even assuming sufficient rate flexibility, then mandatory 
coverage is the alternative.  However, while states likely could require 
insurers to offer coverage for intentional harm caused by a gun as a 
condition of writing a specific coverage line in their state, they cannot 
require an insurer to write in that line.  For example, an auto insurer cannot 
be required to also write homeowners insurance, or a commercial lines 
insurer to write personal lines policies. 
For states, the most logical solution is tying this coverage to 
homeowners (and renters) insurance, a business line that insurers would be 
very reluctant to exit because of a new coverage requirement.122  While this 
                                                                                                                          
119 Of course, an individual who intends to kill or intentionally risks killing someone as part of a 
criminal endeavor has already bypassed these deterrents. 
120 Commentators and courts have expressed similar skepticism that insurance coverage for 
intentional torts would measurably increase the likelihood of occurrence.  See, e.g., Christopher C. 
French, Debunking the Myth that Insurance Coverage Is Not Available or Allowed for Intentional Torts 
or Damages, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 65, 71 (2012) (discussing a Wyoming Supreme Court decision that 
expressed an inability to locate any studies showing that insurance for punitive damages would make 
misconduct more probable); Erik S. Knutsen, Fortuity Clauses in Liability Insurance: Solving 
Coverage Dilemmas for Intentional and Criminal Conduct, 37 QUEEN’S L.J. 73, 109 (2011) (“Most 
insureds do not consider loss of insurance coverage while acting in a manner that could be deemed to 
be intentional or criminal”); Swedloff, supra note 118, at 763–64 (noting that the fear of moral hazard 
is likely exaggerated). 
121 Baker & Siegelman, supra note 118, at 177–79; Swedloff, supra note 118, at 765. 
122 This assumes that insurers can charge adequate rates and contain losses through policy limits 
so that a coverage mandate does not significantly alter existing profitability (or in some cases, loss) 
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would be unpopular with insurers, coverage mandates are both a historic 
and contemporary feature of insurance regulation.  For example, starting in 
1887, New York and many other states mandated a specific insurance 
contract for fire coverage in property policies;123 these provisions still 
remain in force today and their coverage requirements consistently 
upheld.124  States generally require auto insurers to offer uninsured and 
underinsured motorists coverage with specified limits125 and provide 
minimum coverage requirements in general.126  Workers’ compensation 
policies must cover all benefits authorized by state law (without policy 
limits), and disability and life insurance policies must comply with state 
nonforfeiture laws.127   
Conceptually, then, mandating that a homeowners policy include 
coverage for intentional harm caused by a firearm is consistent with a 
state’s traditional regulatory prerogatives.  Exiting a state’s homeowners 
market in the face of such a mandate would be a drastic step for personal 
lines insurers and likely an excessive response to this type of mandate, 
particularly if the allowed rates are adequate, the risks are controllable (i.e., 
                                                                                                                          
margins.  For brevity, I include renters insurance within the ambit of homeowners insurance, though 
the take-up rate for renters insurance is much lower than for homeowners insurance, in part because 
mortgage lenders require homeowners coverage. Sarah Coffey, Renters Insurance for Former 
Homeowners, BANKRATE (July 10, 2012), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/insurance/renters-
insurance-former-homeowners.aspx (“Not everyone is convinced that renters insurance is affordable or 
worth the investment.  About 97 percent of homeowners have insurance coverage, but only about 47 
percent of renters are insured . . . .”). 
123 See Scott G. Johnson, The Suit Limitation Provision and the Equitable Tolling Doctrine, 30 
TORT & INS. L.J. 1015, 1016 n.4 (1995) (“The standard fire policy was first enacted into a statute in 
New York in 1887 and is often called the New York Standard Fire Insurance Policy.”). 
124 N.Y. INS. LAW § 3404 (McKinney 2013); Quaker Hills, LLC v. Pac. Indem. Co., 728 F.3d 
171, 180, 184 (2d Cir. 2013) (upholding the enforceability of the mandatory New York Standard Form 
fire insurance unless an insurer deviates for terms that are more favorable).   
125 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-336(a)(1)–(2) (2013).  States could also require personal lines 
auto insurers to cover wrongful acts committed with firearms.  While auto policies cover far fewer acts 
of gun violence than a homeowners policy, auto liability insurance is already mandated and has an 
extensive enforcement regime in place.  If coverage could be expanded beyond the traditional limits of 
auto liability insurance (i.e., bodily injury and property damage arising out of the use of an auto), then 
requiring both home and auto policies to cover intentional gun violence would expand the overall 
insurance pool, reduce premiums, and provide more compensation to victims. 
126 E.g., id. § 38a-335(a).   
127 See id. § 31-345(a), (b)(2) (requiring workers’ compensation policies to be approved by the 
Insurance Commissioner and requiring the Workers’ Compensation Commission to annually determine 
a sufficient amount to meet expenses incurred); id. § 17b-611(a) (allowing the Commissioner of Social 
Services to provide a subsidized nongroup health insurance coverage for disabled persons); id. § 38a-
439(a) (“[N]o policy of life insurance, except as stated in subsection (i) of this section, shall be 
delivered or issued for delivery in this state unless it contains in substance the following provisions, or 
corresponding provisions which in the opinion of the commissioner are at least as favorable to the 
defaulting or surrendering policyholder as are the minimum requirements hereinafter specified and are 
substantially in compliance with subsection (h) of this section . . . .”).   
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appropriate limits exist),128 and other states enact similar laws that would 
make state market withdrawals increasingly difficult.   
Nor is drafting the language especially difficult.  This coverage could 
be provided by current homeowners policies or through a separate 
endorsement.  For instance, the most current ISO form discussed above, 
the HO 00 03 05 11, could be adapted through a modification of the basic 
insuring agreement to expand the concept of “occurrence” (accident) and 
an additional exception to the intentional harm exclusion.  For example, 
this policy could be amended by defining “firearm” and adding the 
following underlined language: 
Section II – Liability Coverages 
 A.  Coverage E – Personal Liability 
 If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an “insured” 
for damages because of “bodily injury” or “property 
damage” caused by an “occurrence” or  because of “bodily 
injury” caused by a “firearm”, to which this coverage 
applies, we will: . . . . 
Personal Liability . . . does not apply to the following: 
 1.  Expected or Intended Injury 
    “Bodily injury” or “property damage” which is expected or 
intended by an “insured”, even if the resulting “bodily 
injury” or “property damage”: 
a.  Is of a different kind, quality or degree than initially 
expected or intended; or 
b.  Is sustained by a different person, entity or property 
than initially expected or intended. 
 However this Exclusion does not apply to: 
(1) “bodily injury” or “property damage” resulting from 
the use of reasonable force by an “insured” to protect 
persons or property, or  
(2) “bodily injury” resulting from an insured’s use of a 
“firearm.” 
                                                                                                                          
128 In addition to limiting the maximum amount of indemnity an insurer might owe, a state could 
restrict—or authorize insurers to limit—the definition of allowable intentional harm (e.g., no coverage 
for insureds hired to harm the victim, or a premeditated assault with the intention to murder).  The type 
and number of coverage limitations also depends on the desired balance between various public goals.  
For example, the more victim compensation and leveraging of the insurance industry’s risk mitigation 
features that occur, then the more restrictions a state would put on insurers’ use of sub-limits, self-
insured retentions, and limitations on what type of “intentional” harm could still be excluded.   
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IV.  WHO WOULD BUY THIS INSURANCE? 
Assume that the following are true: (1) insurers are required to offer, 
and gun owners must purchase, some form of liability insurance for 
intentional harm through the use of a gun; (2) the rates charged by insurers 
are actuarially valid and not suppressed (or raised) through regulation; 
(3) the proposal captures the three primary objectives of liability 
insurance—protecting policyholder assets, compensating victims, and 
encouraging risk mitigation strategies through underwriting; (4) the 
required coverage and associated limitations (e.g., sub-limits) adequately 
reduce the moral hazard of insuring wrongful acts; and (5) the public 
benefits of mandating coverage for illegal or wrongful acts of gun violence 
are sufficient to justify its use as an appropriate regulatory tool.   
Even if all these conditions exist and there is sufficient political 
support to enact these coverage mandates, one major obstacle remains.  
Those most likely to shoot and injure others are not likely to be insured or 
otherwise have homeowners or renters insurance; nor would civil or 
criminal sanctions associated with violating a statutory requirement to 
purchase liability insurance deter individuals who already face far more 
severe penalties if convicted of an illegal shooting.  The level of gun 
violence in our country is appalling, but unless we can address this issue, 
mandating liability insurance will not noticeably reduce it.     
These problems should give pause to advocates and state legislators 
who wish to reduce gun violence through leveraging the traditional 
advantages of liability insurance.  However, liability insurance offers too 
many potential advantages to be discarded without much greater 
consideration.  These benefits include compensating victims, financially 
protecting policyholders, and insurers’ ability to analyze, underwrite, and 
mitigate loss.  The private insurance market has limitations, but it can also 
be innovative and ready to take (reasonably) measurable risks.  Insurers 
have developed insurance products for many perils previously thought 
uninsurable because of traditional moral hazard concerns,129 significant 
exposure issues,130 or simply because the risk was historically ignored for 
                                                                                                                          
129 For example, some professional liability insurance policies cover sexual abuse claims.  See 
supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
130 Insurance coverage for acts of terrorism is widely available, though only after the 9/11 attacks 
when the federal government created a reinsurance backstop covering a portion of loss associated with 
an announced act of terrorism.  Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 
2322.  This program is supported by most insurers, reinsurers, agents and brokers, and commercial 
policyholders, and demonstrates that public and private participation in some insurance programs can 
be successful.  While acts of terrorism strike locally, they are directed against the nation as a whole and 
a national response seems appropriate.  This Article focuses almost solely on state regulatory solutions; 
additional thought and research should be given to whether the federal government has a role in 
encouraging a private insurance market for mandatory firearm liability insurance covering wrongful 
acts.   
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coverage purposes.131  
Further, the use of a private regulatory tool such as insurance might not 
only be more effective and less costly than a government program or 
mandate, but it might significantly temper the philosophical or political 
concerns many gun owners have about (further) governmental intrusion on 
Second Amendment rights.132  A coverage mandate could financially 
motivate insurers to conduct or support additional research on reducing 
gun violence, as there would be a better alignment between their policy 
coverage obligations and the harm caused through firearms.  These private 
market economic incentives could also avoid the current limitations on 
government-funded research in this area and the divisive political debates 
surrounding them.133   
There are other ways to think about gun violence, insurance, and 
government policy.  Two are briefly discussed here, simply as a starting 
point, to illustrate several alternatives in conceptualizing how insurance, or 
similar compensation/protection programs, could be used to address and 
reduce gun violence in our country.  
A.  Creating Compensation Funds Through Surcharges 
States that mandate liability insurance for gun owners could require a 
portion of the insurance premium to go to a compensation fund for victims 
shot by an uninsured person.  While there are precedents for this type of 
subsidization,134 there are fairness issues in requiring individuals (as 
                                                                                                                          
131 For example, while the “absolute pollution exclusion” is utilized in most commercial general 
liability (“CGL”) policies, companies can obtain a variety of specialized liability policies and 
endorsements covering environmental risks.  See ANN WAGNER, AM. L. INST., THE IMPACT OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ON REAL ESTATE AND BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: BROWNFIELDS AND BEYOND, 
CURRENT INSURANCE POLICIES FOR INSURING AGAINST ENVIRONMENTAL RISK (2013), available at 
SU035 ALI-CLE 1685 (Westlaw).  Damage to a company’s reputation and the retention of a public 
relations firm to “restore” the reputation is often included in professional liability policies, particularly 
those covering emerging cyber and social media risks.  See Baker & Swedloff, supra note 8, at 1422 
(“[I]nsurers provide loss prevention services for other reasons as well (such as marketing, public 
relations, and buyer demand) . . . .”). 
132 A private regulatory tool may reduce, but it certainly will not eliminate, gun owners’ concerns.  
Mandating insurance means there must be an enforcement mechanism and accessible records, whether 
under public or private control, correlating gun ownership with the required insurance.  See Mocsary, 
supra note 9, at 1258 (noting that “[a]n effect of mandatory insurance would be to provide insurance 
companies with a substantial amount of information about insureds” and that the vast amount of data 
insurers would have raises the question by gun owners about “whether, and to what extent, the firearm-
specific information will be protected”). 
133 See supra note 25. 
134 Insurers are required to contribute to state guaranty funds that are activated when an insurer 
becomes insolvent and has insufficient assets to pay claims, and many licensed professionals, such as 
lawyers and brokers, may be required to contribute to funds that compensate individuals harmed by 
other professionals in that field.  See generally Kent M. Forney, Insurer Insolvencies and Guaranty 
Associations, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 813 (1995) (providing a discussion of the insurance insolvency 
problem, a history of state liquidation acts, and developments in state guaranty associations).  The 
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opposed to commercial enterprises) who are fully compliant with a law to 
pay for the consequences of those who are not.  In addition, unlike other 
compensation schemes, the percentage of those purchasing firearm liability 
insurance and paying into the fund is likely to be less than the number of 
uninsured tortfeasors responsible for the majority of shootings.  The cost of 
this insurance would increase significantly, with the majority of the claims 
paid likely going to victims of shooters who did not obtain the mandatory 
insurance.135   
B.  Play or Pay 
A more promising alternative would be to mandate liability insurance 
but allow gun purchasers the option to either purchase the insurance or to 
pay a surcharge (perhaps more expensive than the cost of the insurance), 
with the proceeds of the surcharge going to a compensation fund for gun 
violence victims.  This option could allow the three major roles of liability 
insurance to operate by: (1) providing compensation for victims of gun 
violence; (2) creating incentives for liability insurers to further develop and 
utilize loss prevention mechanisms that could reduce gun violence; and (3) 
protecting gun owners who purchased insurance instead of paying the 
surcharge.  Creating this option may also diminish the opposition to an 
insurance mandate, though the political furor surrounding the Affordable 
Care Act’s individual mandate136 suggests otherwise.  However, it only 
partially addresses the compensation function of insurance, as it does not 
guarantee that the funds collected through the surcharge would be 
sufficient to compensate the victims of gun violence. 
We can also review the assumption, noted here and more definitively 
stated elsewhere,137 that a liability insurance mandate would be both 
                                                                                                                          
National Conference of Insurance Guaranty Funds (property casualty) and the National Organization of 
Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Associations provide extensive information on state guaranty laws. 
NAT’L CONF. INS. GUARANTY FUNDS, http://ncigf.org; http://www.nolhga.com (last visited Apr. 15, 
2014); NAT’L ORG. LIFE & HEALTH INS. GUARANTY ASS’NS, https://www.nolhga.com (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2014). 
135 A more direct approach would be to tax all gun sales at the federal or national level, rather than 
surcharging liability policies or mandating insurance coverage with or without coverage for intentional 
harm.  While this plan could provide more funds for victim compensation, research, and public health 
strategies aimed at reducing gun violence, it would not utilize the insurance industry’s ability to rate, 
price risk, and enhance gun safety and ownership.  Nor would it provide specific insurance coverage 
for gun owners.  This proposal is not new and brings a separate set of legal and public policy concerns 
that will not be addressed in this Article. 
136 The mandate establishes a “shared responsibility payment” whereby a taxpayer who “fails to 
meet the requirement [to “maintain minimum essential coverage”] must pay a “penalty with respect to 
such failures.”  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)(b)(1) (2012). 
137 See Mocsary, supra note 9, at 1258 (“[T]here is little doubt that criminals will not 
insure . . . .”); id. at 1260 (“Rightly or wrongly, Americans have more ingrained reasons to defy 
insurance mandates that they believe may lead to confiscation [of firearms]. . . . In other words, there 
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widely ignored by individuals who legally own guns and irrelevant to the 
majority of tortfeasors who are responsible for much of the gun violence.  
However, some gun owners would purchase mandatory insurance because 
it was the law, regardless of personal objections.  Some gun right 
advocates, such as the NRA, and gun owners do perceive (correctly) the 
gaps in existing insurance coverage since there is a market for enhanced 
liability coverage for accidental and self-defense shootings.138  Thus, there 
is a subset of people that would obey an insurance mandate, we just do not 
know the size of that subset and whether it would constitute a sufficiently 
large risk pool to truly engage the private insurance market and trigger its 
ability to actuarially assess the causes and consequences of gun violence, 
underwrite liability coverage for wrongful acts committed with a firearm, 
and reduce at least some of the potential for gun violence through risk-
based premiums. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Advocates for mandatory liability insurance rightly point out its 
potential advantages.  These include not only policyholder protection and 
victim compensation, but also leveraging risk mitigation functions that 
insurance schemes can provide.  Importantly, these benefits would also 
extend beyond the traditional recipients (i.e., policyholders and victims) to 
include individuals typically not part of a liability scheme, such as 
domestic partners and family members.  Delaying access to firearms and 
restricting their use to particular individuals could diminish the use of 
firearms in suicide attempts and domestic disputes.  In particular, since 
suicides account for over sixty percent of gun violence, measures that 
could reduce gun access to those contemplating this act could be a 
significant public policy achievement. 
Homeowners policies may now cover the relatively small number of 
accidental firearm injuries and deaths, but insurers are reducing even this 
coverage through expanded intentional harm exclusions.  Requiring 
insurance coverage for wrongful acts committed with a firearm would 
significantly expand the insurance benefits available to reduce and 
compensate for gun violence.  There is sufficient regulatory authority and 
insurance precedent for regulators to mandate such coverage, which would 
better align insurers’ risk mitigation strategies with actual losses under 
their policies.  The more difficult issue is the presumed disconnect between 
gun violence and the users’ willingness to purchase liability insurance even 
if required.  This conundrum should not end the debate. 
                                                                                                                          
are reasons to believe that many otherwise-law-abiding firearm owners would respond to an insurance 
mandate the same way that they have responded to mandatory gun registration: by defying it.”).  
138 See supra text accompanying notes 75–77. 
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We do not have enough information either to reject or champion the 
use of insurance as a tool to significantly reduce gun violence.  We do 
know, however, that the potential benefits of liability insurance could be 
considerable and that the industry can, when motivated, assess and 
underwrite risks that previously were considered uninsurable.  For now, 
analysis and debate should be supported, rather than shutting—or 
shouting—down advocates on any side of these issues. 
